There may be no story as old as that of the child of privilege, spoiled in the things of the world, who finally achieves happiness through coming to appreciate the simple charms of working-class life. But equal in strength are the real life stories of American parents: their drive for the accumulation of personal wealth, so frequently justi fied as "for the children." The place of wealth in the good life of a child is deeply controversial, and it should surprise no one to see it played out in child custody law.
Under the statutes of almost all states, custody disputes between divorcing parents must be decided in the "best interests of the child."1 These statutes often list particular factors that are to be considered when deciding children's interests, such as " [t] he love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child."2 Some statutes also expressly forbid consideration of particular factors, such as the gender of the parent.3 Even with these attempts to narrow the inquiry, the best-interests standard remains notably vague.4 This inevitably leads to serious disputes about which factors ought to be considered, and how much weight they should be given. Perhaps the most troubling of these disputes has involved the relevance to the custody decision of each parent's ability to provide the child with ma terial goods.
A few states address this issue directly in their child custody stat utes. Florida and Michigan explicitly provide that parental ability to 45-47 (1975) .
The "best interests of the child" standard defies easy definition. For a fuller discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 23-32. The standard does not apply outside of divorce cus tody cases, where custody determinations are between parents and nonparents. The due process clause protects parents' interests in the nondestruction of their families unless a state can show sufficient harm to the child. See generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) .
satisfy a child's material needs is a factor in custody determinations.5 Missouri explicitly forbids consideration of a parent's financial re sources.6 Oregon allows its consideration only where the child is suf fering emotional or physical harm.7 Most states, however, leave the is sue to the discretion of the courts, who are asked to interpret broad statutory requirements like "the capability and desire of each parent to meet [the child's] needs"8 or " [t] he health, safety, and welfare of the child"9 or catch-all provisions like "other factors that the court consid ers pertinent."10
In a sense, considering wealth in child custody decisions is the ob vious choice. Rhetoric underlying calls for better enforcement of child support and expressions of concern about the effects of welfare reform seem to presuppose that access to economic resources is an essential component of children's welfare.11 Society is committed to the view that money matters to children. Many courts take this view, often con sidering financial factors without pausing to provide further justifica tion.12 Even where courts are not explicit about the relevance of pa rental income, empirical evidence shows that they frequently take it into consideration.13 13. See Carol R. Lowery, Child Custody Decisions in Divorce Proceedings: A Survey of Ju dges, 12 PROF. PSYCHOL. 492, 494 (1981) (finding that judges ranked parents' financial sufficiency as fourteenth in a list of twenty suggested factors for awarding child custody, giving it a mean importance rank of 6.97 on an importance scale of 1 (of little importance) to 11 (highly important)); Leighton E. Stamps, Seth Kunen, & Robert Lawyer, Ju dicial Atti tudes Regarding Custody and Vis it ation Issues, 25 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 23, 33 (1996) (finding that in a survey of judges asking them to rate the importance of various factors in their child-custody decisionmaking on a scale of 1 (not very important) to 5 (very impor tant), the average rating for " [t] he capacity of the parents to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and material needs" was 3.9); Jennifer E. Horne 17. Despite some controversy about the use of common law rules, they are a generally well accepted and desirable tool for improving the quality of judicial decisionmaking, even in the highly discretionary area of family law. Even without explicit legislative authorization, courts are empowered to create common law rules to improve their decisionmaking under the statute. Child custody disputes are precisely the kinds of situations where courts' power to constrain their own discretion can be essential to achieving the ultimate goal of furthering the interests of the child. Such judicial common law rulemaking may have been the aim of legislatures in adopting such a broad standard for child custody determinations. Carl Schneider has referred to the best interests standard as exemplifying "rule-building" discre tion -discretion that is awarded in the hopes that, with experience and time, courts will de velop better rules than the legislature could have developed ex ante. Carl E. Schneider, Dis cretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215 REV. , 2244 REV. (1991 . This may be the reason that judicially crafted common law rules are common in the child custody context. See Marsha Garrison, How Do Ju dges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 514 (1996) . In fact, in his discussion of the optimal mix of rules and discretion in child custody decisionmaking, Carl Schneider recommends that courts move farther in the direction of carving out presumptions and rules within the broad best interests of the child standard. Schneider, supra, at 2297. This approach is also preferred by Mary Ann Glendon. Mary Ann Glendon, Fi xed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Fa mily Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165 REV. , 1170 REV. (1986 .
The most famous of these cominon law rules is West Virginia's primary caretaker pre sumption, where courts were bound to award custody to the parent who had provided the greatest degree of daily care in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary. The ra tionale behind this rule was that being placed with the primary caretaker was more often than not the better placement for the child, and that constraining judicial discretion in this way would lead to better results for children in the aggregate. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) .
Although the fact that imposing constraints on judicial discretion in custody decisions asks judges to blind themselves to some factors in an individual case in order to secure greater overall accuracy may seem problematic, it can easily be justified. In adopting a com-This Note takes a child-centered approach, arguing that eliminat ing consideration of wealth in judicial determinations of post-divorce child custody may further the interests of children. Although, as Part I demonstrates, the possession of wealth is clearly relevant to children's interests, Part II shows that judicial consideration of wealth, beyond the level of basic subsistence, may lead to decisions that are not in children's interests. Wealth allows the distorting influence of socio economic biases and cognitive errors, obscures the importance of child support as a means of meeting children's financial needs, and creates harmful incentives for parental behavior in divorce litigation. Part Ill briefly defends an exception that allows consideration of wealth when minimal subsistence is implicated.
I. THE RELEVANCE OF WEALTH
As an initial matter, wealth obviously plays a role in a child's well being. It does not necessarily follow, though, that judicial considera tion of this factor will result in better child custody decisionmaking. Using the rules of evidence as a metaphor, the relevance of all infor mation must be weighed against the possibility that its inclusion will distort the decisionmaking process more than it enables it.18 This Part discusses the first half of this balancing test: the relevance of wealth to children's interests.
Because the conclusion that financial resources are important to children's interests is so strongly intuitive, it may seem that there is lit tle need to defend wealth as a relevant factor in determining the best interests of the child. Nevertheless, two California courts, and a few commentators,19 have challenged even this basic intuition, so some thing in the way of defense is required. This Note objects to the con sideration of wealth in child custody decisionmaking, but not for the simple reason that it does not matter to children. The relevance of wealth must be asserted fairly before the case against it can be made.
Section I.A demonstrates that wealth is in fact relevant to the best interests of the child. Section LB discusses the broader social concerns that lead courts and commentators to deny the relevance of wealth.
mon law rule, courts are not, as it may appear, sacrificing the interests of the particular child who is the subject of the litigation to the interests of children in general. Rather, a common law is created when judges wish to stop themselves from considering wealth because they could never really know when they were considering it appropriately, and because they are more likely to be wrong than right in any given case. To put the matter another way, no one ever decides a case under a common law rule knowing with any degree of certainty that it is to the disadvantage of any particular child.
18. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that evidence is not admissible if the possi bility of prejudice from inclusion outweighs its probative value. FED. R. Evm. 403.
Section LC issues a few caveats to the relevance of wealth: although it is clearly relevant, its importance is frequently overstated.
A. Why Wealth Matters
Although the question of how to determine the best interests of the child is controversial,20 the most commonly accepted notions of the standard are child-centered. The best interests of the child standard was adopted precisely because of fears that the child's perspective was lost in the storm that resulted from each parent, with his or her lawyer, advocating for adult interests. The new test was intended to keep the court's focus on what is good for the child. 21 The view that financial resources are not relevant to children's positive experience of life is rightly dismissed as "idealistic. "22 On each of the two most influential child-centered views of children's best in terests, wealth matters. One of these views, advanced by David Chambers, advocates decisionmaking based on a child's hypothetical future assessment of the custody choice; i.e., decisions are evaluated based on how positively the child will experience them. A competing child-centered view is advanced by Jon Elster, whose conception of children's best interests is aimed at protecting a child's autonomy.29 Under this test, the best interest standard secures for children the ability to make their own choices as they develop the ca pability to do so. He too recognizes that under his view of children's best interests, wealth is clearly relevant.30 Except for children of very affluent parents,31 increasing availability of financial resources also in creases their access to opportunities for autonomous choicethrough access to education, travel, and cultural activities, as well as the more basic human goods.32
B. Denial and Broader Social Values
Given the clear relevance of wealth to children's best interests, it may seem strange that anyone has argued otherwise. But they have: in particular, California courts (and several commentators) have claimed that wealth has nothing to do with the best interests of the child.33
Because wealth is so obviously relevant to children's interests, these arguments are better read as appeals for consideration of other concerns. Denying the relevance of wealth to the best interests of the child may be another way of inserting the interests of third parties and Quite often their distress is rooted in, or at least intensified by, financial problems. Loss of the father's income can cause a disruptive, downward spiral in which children must adjust to a declining standard of living, a mother who is less psychologically available and is home less often, an apartment in an unf amiliar neighborhood, a different school, and new friends. 31. At some point, the diminishing margin of return makes access to further resources not particularly significant for the welfare of children.
32. See Elster, supra note 22, at 15, 28.
33.
In re Marriage of Fingert, 271 Cal. Rptr. 389, 392 (Cal. App. 1990) (stating that by relying upon the father's greater financial resources, the lower court "improperly presume [d] that children should live in the community of the parent who is wealthier. This factor has nothing to do with the best interests of the child."); Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 491 (Cal. 1986) ("The trial court's decision referred to William's better economic position, and to matters such as homeownership and ability to provide a more 'wholesome environment ' which reflect economic advantage. But ... ' [T] here is no basis for assuming a correlation between wealth and good parenting or wealth and happiness. '") (citing Ramsay Laing Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335, 350 (1982) [W]omen are more likely to be unemployed than men and, when they are employed, earn less, regardless of race or level of education. Any rule based on the relative wealth of parents will almost invariably favor men. Such a ruling has the effect of discriminating against women.36
Unfairness to women is an unfortunate consequence of considering wealth in child custody determinations. In general, mothers have less access to financial resources than their male counterparts, due largely to the legacy of the patriarchal family. This wealth disparity has two types of causes. The effect of discrimination in wages and hiring, and the greater likelihood that women will choose to remain out of the workforce to care for their children.37 Differentials caused by discrimi nation are almost uncontestedly unfair to women.38 Wealth effects caused by women's life choices should also be a cause for concern, de spite arguments that women's exercise of autonomous choice should be sufficient to guard against unfairness.39 The fact that the choices of social roles in this context are particularly constrained by the residual influence of patriarchy,40 along with skepticism about whether it is 34. Jon Elster argues that the desire to further various policy preferences, rather than secure children's interests, explains the reluctance to consider wealth in custody detennina tions. Elster, supra note 22, at 27-28. 36. 271 Cal. Rptr. 389, 392 (App. 1990). Nancy Polikoff makes a similar connection: "There is no necessary correlation between economic dominance and the best interests of children. In fact, the dominant parent is likely to have achieved that status ... through the operation of sex discrimination and sex segregation in the workplace." Polikoff, supra note 33, at 179.
37. See Chambers, supra note 11, at 540.
See id.

Chambers argues that:
If there were no gender discrimination in wages, and the only disparity in earnings came from the fact that one parent had participated less in the labor market in order to care for her children, it would not be bothersome that parents who assume differing roles ... during marriage permitted them at separation to offer differing advantages to the child. 40. The fact of constrained choice also provides an argument against claims sometimes made that mothers should be rewarded for the particularly meritorious sacrifices they make good to encourage parties to make choices during marriage that con template divorce,41 counsels against relying simply on parental choice to gauge equity.
Another social value that may underlie attempts to eliminate con sideration of wealth from custody determinations is the desire to sup port cultural pluralism -diversity in the lifestyles and beliefs of members of society -through family law.42 Courts are generally re luctant to decide which families children should live with based on cer tain types of social differences between parents. Since the family oper ates as an important element in society, where people's values and interests are shaped and expressed, courts are rightly reluctant to use their power to force families to reflect values and beliefs that are deeply contested.43 Correspondingly, courts avoid using racial or re ligious factors in placing children. 41. The notion that parents should accept the post-divorce fate that they have chosen goes against the commonly-held notion that we should neither expect nor encourage parents to make their choices based on the likelihood of divorce. While it is true that divorce is common, few people enter into a marriage with full awareness of that possibility. See Differences in social class are as central a part of the nation's diversity as race or religion.46 Of course, making decisions between two parents based on wealth does not pose nearly as large a threat to a plural cul ture,47 but discomfort with preferences for higher-class existence must at least partly explain the calls to eliminate this factor.
Whether to consider broader social values in custody decisions that are supposed to be made in the best interests of the child is extremely controversial.48 But courts ought to be honest when making decisions for these reasons, and not use the legal structure of the interests of children as a means to secure other ends. Although introducing broader social values into custody decisions may be desirable, it does 528 So. 2d 1002, 1015 (La. 1988) (holding that a "broad social policy" of noninterference in families outweighs any consideration of material advantage); Jn re Guardianship of Doney, 570 P.2d 575, 578 (Mont. 1977) ("Manifestly, the expression 'welfare of the child' was never intended to penalize a parent because he may not be financially able to provide his child with the comforts and advantages which more fortunate parents may provide for their chil If such be the rule, well might the bright, intelligent child in the humblest home of poor, de voted parents be taken and given to the home much better provided and with much greater facilities existing, owing to the prominence and wealth of the owners, but strangers to the child, when, in the viewpoint of the chancellor, the best welfare of the child, as a future citi zen of this state, would be subserved. Such applications of equity do violence to the .. . as surance that modern society and civilization has given to them; the assurance that, no matter how humble their home may be, or how little of this world's possessions they may have, their child, begotten by them, shall remain with them .... no good to confuse the issue by cloaking these values in the language of the best interest of the child. Whatever may be said for considering social values and third party interests, they do not necessarily coincide with the interests of children. This Note aims to give more honest, de tailed, and child-centered arguments against the use of wealth in child custody decisions.
See
C. Qualifying the Importance of Wealth
Some caution is necessary in asserting the relevance of wealth to children's best interests. First, the importance of wealth tends to be overestimated in relation to other factors. Though it is undeniably relevant, wealth plays a very limited role in life satisfaction, all things considered.49 People have a tendency to exaggerate the importance of wealth to well-being.5° For this reason, courts ought to be cautious when assessing the importance of wealth in relation to other factors.
Second, it is difficult to isolate wealth from the other factors that matter to children's interests. This interrelationship among factors raises the possibility that wealth is correlated with other featuressuch as a lack of commitment to or interest in the child -that cut in the other direction, making custody with the wealthier parent also dis advantageous. The strong claim, that possession of greater financial resources necessarily indicates lesser commitment to the child, cannot be supported. But a weaker claim, that some decisions to amass per sonal wealth may suggest a lower priority on the interests of children, should at least temper enthusiasm for custody with the wealthier par ent.
Mary Becker has made the strong claim that the wealthier parent is very likely to also be the worse parent, for reasons directly correlated with the possession· of wealth.51 According to Becker, the parent who makes financial sacrifices for the child is, by definition, more commit ted. Becker speaks in a general way about sex role differences, oper ating on the quite defensible assumption that women tend to be the less wealthy parents. But her argument can easily be individualized into the economic claim that, gender aside, the possession of wealth is proof that one is a less committed parent:
Women's poor economic status relative to men [in part) reflects women's greater commitment to children. . . . If women and men were equally 49. See ARGYLE, supra note 25, at 95 ("[C]lass and income have a definite, but quite small, effect on happiness.").
50. See CAMPBELL, supra note 25, at 59 ("It is always better to be rich than poor. This is a fact which is universally understood: what is not so well-recognized is how modest this rela tionship is and how many other influences come into play in determining an individual's feelings of well-being."). [Vol. 99:216 concerned about children's welfare, women would refuse to bear and raise children, given the economic consequences, unless men ... trans ferred sufficient assets to women to offset their economic loss in wage la bor. Therefore, women's poor economic status is itself evidence of their commitment to, concern for, and emotional investment with, children.52
Because the work of raising children interferes with the accumulation of wealth, Becker asserts that the possession of wealth can itself serve as evidence of a lack of parental commitment.
In its strongest form -using wealth as a direct indication of the level of commitment of different parents -Becker's claim is fl awed from an economic perspective. In a world where women are discrimi nated against in the employment market and receive lower wages than men for the same labor, women do not have the power to strike the sort of bargain with men that Becker proposes.53 Their choice is not between making a "male" salary or having children -if it were, they could perhaps demand from devoted fathers that the burdens of hav ing and raising children be equally distributed between both parents. But this is not the world women live in -what a woman gives up in wages in exchange for raising a child is considerably less than what a man would sacrifice. Even between equally committed parents, the ra tional baby-bargain would leave women with a lower income. Thus, economic inequality cannot serve as direct evidence of parental com mitment in our society. 54 Even if Becker's strong claim were true, it could not alone justify the complete exclusion of wealth from the best interests detennina tion. Becker's arguments essentially use a lack of wealth as a proxy for parental commitment. But the commitment of the parent to the child, although very important, is only one among many factors relevant to a child's best interests, however defined.55 Becker's claim would merely indicate that the presence of one factor (wealth) is good evidence for a discrepancy in another factor (parental commitment). It does not show that wealth is not itself important to children's welfare. Wealth could still operate as a tie-breaker between equally committed par ents, or even as a benefit that could outweigh the burden of being placed with a less committed parent.
Softened somewhat, however, Becker's argument issues an impor tant caution that should be taken seriously. Courts should be aware of the prospect that, for some parents with greater financial resources, this may be the most they have to offer. Wealth may sometimes be a 54. Becker additionally fails to account for situations where wealth is unrelated to wage earning, such as when it is inherited, won in the lottery, or provided through remarriage.
See supra text accompanying note 2.
sign of parental priorities that work against the interests of their chil dren. The possibility that wealth may sometimes, though certainly not always, be correlated with other parental features that are less than beneficial for children makes unqualified support for custody with the wealthier parent inappropriate. As this section shows, wealth has a clear, although not an absolute, role in the best interests of the child.
II. T HE P ROBLEM WITH C ONSIDERING W EALTH
Despite the relevance of wealth to children's best interests, consid eration of financial factors can lead to distorted judicial decisionmak ing that can work against the interests of the child. This Part argues that considering wealth in child custody determinations leads to four significant problems that may ultimately make it better for children if wealth is ignored. Section II.A discusses the distorting impact of so cioeconomic biases, causing judges to take wealth and wealth correlated factors more seriously than they merit. Section II.B argues that a different effect, the tendency in a multi-factor analysis to give disproportionate weight to factors that can be known with certainty, will lead judges to give wealth more importance than it deserves. Sec tion 11.C demonstrates how consideration of wealth in child custody determinations invites judges to use custody to avoid large child sup port orders. This lessens the ability of these two tools -child support and custody -to work together to maximize the welfare of children post-divorce. Finally, Section 11.D shows that consideration of wealth encourages parents to engage in various activities, such as increased litigation, that are detrimental to children.
A. Judicial Bias
Upper and middle-class family court judges are not immune from pervasive socio-economic biases. Most judges are reasonably wealthy, and it is common to exaggerate the importance of the features of one's own lifestyle.56 Of course, a judge would be correct in believing that family wealth makes some difference in children's well-being.57 The problem with bias is that it leads to an exaggerated perception of these effects. In general, discretion in the best interests determination gives free reign to such distorting unconscious biases, resulting in custody awards that are not necessarily in the best interests of the child.58 A similar problem has been clearly noted with considerations of race in custody decisions.59 The Supreme Court's decision in Palmore v. Sidoti/'0 which held unconstitutional judicial consideration of the ef fects of racial prejudice in deciding whether to place a child in the cus tody of a mixed-race couple, gave constitutional status to concerns about judicial racial bias. The decision has been read as creating a con stitutional common law rule to counter racist unconscious biases:
[T]aking all child custody decisions into account, and in particular being aware that family court judges themselves may be infected with biases that lead them to make distorted all-things-considered judgments, the Court concluded that the formalist rule barring consideration of private racial biases would lead to more accurate determinations of what was in the child's best interests than a rule allowing family court judges to take everything into account.61
Biases about wealth raise similar concerns about distorted judicial decisionmaking. A common law rule against considering wealth is not constitutionally required because wealth is not a characteristic: pro tected by heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.62 As a policy matter, however, the same considerations that led the Court to constrain discretion in Palmore make such a rule a desirable tool for ensuring that children end up in the best placement.
Judicial bias is; of course, common in areas other than wealth. One commentator has pointed out that judges are equally likely to over emphasize "being articulate, attractive, well-educated, or well- At least under the law as it stands, it is difficult to make this claim. Al though the consideration of wealth has a disporportoniate impact on women, it is difficult to show that this consideration is motivated by a desire to discriminate against them, as the law would require. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) . But see Becker, supra note 51, at 175 (suggesting such a motive); Home, supra note 13, at 2121-22 (same).
adjusted."63 He argues that it makes no sense to single out considera tions of wealth for special condemnation, if we allow all of these other factors to influence judicial decisionmaking. But there are reasons to treat socio-economic bias differently than these other distorting fac tors. First, outside of considerations of income, there is no comparable evidentiary question to address: what is it that judges would do to blind themselves to the impact of parental attractiveness? No matter how problematic it is, there's little that can be realistically done to ad dress it. Parental wealth is much different. If consideration of parental wealth were forbidden, various pieces of evidence relating to this fac tor would be excluded from the proceeding.64 Forming a common law rule here makes a difference in addressing overvaluation of socio economic status.
Further, it seems likely that judges already know that they are not supposed to choose between parents on the basis of attractiveness or articulateness. While these things may provide some value to a child, judges easily recognize its limits.65 Judges may not be able to exclude these considerations from their minds completely, but if asked the question: "should you consider the parents' relative attractiveness in making this custody determination?," the answer from almost all judges would be "no". Most likely, the only reason that there is not al ready a common law rule against consideration of these factors is that no one has deemed it necessary. Consideration of socioeconomic status, like consideration of racial prejudice, is substantially different. As the disagreement between courts on this issue has shown, judges asked to determine how important wealth is to any particular case have a hard question to answer. The existence of this difficult question is what makes the common law rule imperative -judges are less clearly aware of their bias, and of the need to constrain it. A rule con straining this bias is necessary, because the instincts to disregard the factor are not well developed.
63. See Altman, supra note 35, at 333.
64. Precisely what evidence would be fo rbidden could be the subject of some debate. Certainly, evidence about the balance in bank accounts and other sources of income would be excluded. Presumably, as well, attempts could be made to eliminate evidence about the size of each parent's house, or the toys that the child would have access to at either resi dence. This latter category is more difficult, of course, because this evidence could also be relevant to establishing more relevant factors.
[Vol. 99:216
B. The Problem of the Too-Clear Factor
Of all of the factors affecting children's best interests after divorce, parental wealth is not the most important but is probably the easiest to measure. Attachment to parents and other more ambiguous psycho logical factors are generally much more central to children's inter ests,66 but also are considerably more indeterminate. Courts looking at these complicated issues will inevitably tend to give too much weight to the wealth comparison, simply because of its clarity. 67 Appellate courts complain that trial courts rely too heavily on fi nancial factors in relation to more important intangible factors. This critique is implicit when appellate courts overturn trial courts' custody decisions on the basis that "while ... consideration of the relative fi nancial standing of the parents may be a relevant factor, it is not dis positive."68 The existence of a number of reversals on these grounds shows that trial courts do give inappropriate weight to financial factors by treating them as dispositive in custody proceedings.69
There is a psychological explanation for the tendency of courts to overvalue financial factors. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have discussed a common cognitive error called the "certainty ef fect".70 People have an irrational tendency to overvalue clear out comes in relation to ones they know with less certainty. Kahneman and Tversky have recently applied this effect to the multivariable deci sions involved in conflict resolution. In these sorts of negotiations, they claim, parties have a tendency to overvalue certain outcomes, such as land transfers, in relation to uncertain ones, such as goodwill.71
66. See ARGYLE, supra note 25; K.laff, supra note 33; Elizabeth Scott, Rational Deci sionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 34 n.75 (1990) ("[T)here is con sensus that the relationship between parent and child is a more significant criterion than the parent's economic status .... ").
67. See Horne, supra note 13, at 2125 (expressing concern that care-giving skills tend to be devalued because they are not "readily assigned a dollar value"). For a similar point in the context of sexuality, see Nadler v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967), in which the court expressed concern that the trial court had over emphasized the mother's sexuality because it was a crude and obvious characteristic; more important and subtle factors, the court held, had been obscured. Even when an unclear possibility of goodwill is actually worth more to a party, the party will still prefer the clearer, but lesser, benefits of land transfer.
Child custody decisionmaking may operate in a similar manner. Financial assets are certain, and other parental features, such as emo tional attachment, are quite uncertain. The certainty effect thus pro vides another reason why eliminating wealth as a factor may improve the quality of judicial decisions overall.
C. Preserving the Child Supp ort Solution
Several courts that have refused to consider the wealth of the re spective parties in custody determinations have explicitly relied on child support as the proper means to secure children's financial well being.72 Commentators have also designated the child support obliga tion as at least a partial solution to the problem of differential parental financial resources.73 These courts and commentators are right about child support, at least in a limited way. Refusing to consider wealth in custody disputes is a way of ensuring that the possibility of lessening wealth disparities through child support is taken seriously.
Child support cannot provide a complete answer to the problem of wealth in child custody determinations, because it is only designed to partially alleviate true financial disparities between parents. For ex ample, some differences in parental wealth do not involve financial re sources that are available for transfer through child support, such as This dismissal of Tribe's concern about the use of statistical base rates, however, does not refute the impact of the certainty effect. Although statistics are quantified, they are no more intrinsically certain than other evidence. Rather, all that statistics do is quantify the degree of uncertainty in a factor. In fact, it may be just this uncertainty that causes them to be undervalued. The court's ability to determine wealth, on the other hand, is quantifiably certain. resources from a parent's new spouse.74 These resources would be available to a child in the remarried parent's household, but are not funds eligible for transfer to the other parent. 75 In addition, even when dealing with resources that are available to be transferred through child support, the existing system does not con template a complete redistribution of wealth in order to secure chil dren's best interests: "[A] child support order may not accuratdy re flect what children actually require but, rather, what the parent can reasonably be expected to pay."76 State legislatures have further un dercut the obligation in order to address issues of perceived fairness to support-paying parents (typically fathers77) and their new families. 78 Thus, even when all family resources are potentially eligible for child support, and child support schemes are perfectly enforced, differen tials in the financial resources available in different households will remain.
Although child support cannot completely resolve the problem, the benefits of using it to its fullest extent suggest another reason not to consider wealth. If courts are allowed to consider financial factors in custody, they may be motivated partly by the desire to lessen the need for child support. Given the increasing popularity of the father's rights movement, which frequently decries large child support pay ments as unfair to a noncustodial parent, it is very likely that at least some judges share the sentiment.79 Considerations of wealth can be used to subvert the purposes and structures of this sometimes un popular duty.80 In G.J.F. v. K. B.F. , a Pennsylvania court awarded cus tody to the wealthier father partially so that he would not have to pro vide child support, explicitly stating that if the father were granted custody, he would not have to pay child support and "finance a second household."81 What was explicit in G.J.F. is undoubtedly implicit in other decisions.
The historical roots of the development of the child support obliga tion show that it was intended to work with custody as a means of en suring children's best interests. Before the child support obligation be came part of divorce proceedings, custody was often awarded to parents based purely on their independent abilities to support their children financially.82 Women were only rarely able to win custody of their children under this standard even though, at that time, the dis parity between men's and women's emotional involvement in the lives of their children was likely greater than today. One of the major ad vantages of the duty of post-divorce child support is that children are able to live with the parent to whom they are more attached, while at the same time receiving adequate resources. Allowing judges to use child custody decisions to lessen child support payments abandons this desirable flexibility, and thus jeopardizes the interests of children.
Focusing on the availability of child support, then, does not pro vide a justification for the complete elimination of the consideration of wealth. It does, however, provide another reason why, all things con sidered, it is better for children if parental wealth is not taken into ac count. Disallowing consideration of wealth in deciding custody allows custody and child support to be more effectively used together to se cure children's well-being.
D. Incentive Effects
Children's welfare is also aided by removal of some of the incen tives caused by inclusion of wealth as a factor in custody decisions. The substantive rules of adjudication influence the behavior of par ents. Eliminating consideration of wealth eliminates undesirable in centives for divorcing parents, such as the incentive for parents who have little to offer other than wealth to litigate, and the incentive to impoverish the other parent and child pending custody determina tions.
Inclusion of wealth as a factor inserts another variable that can give parents with a marginal chance of success an incentive to liti gate,83 subjecting the child to a very difficult process.84 Any constraint on judicial discretion in custody determinations would of course re duce litigation, and consequently spare children a degree of agony.85 One commentator has even suggested that deciding custody through a coin flip would be more desirable than the present system.86 The need to enable settlement and avoid litigation by constraining judicial dis cretion was one of the concerns underlying the creation of West Virginia's primary caretaker presumption, a common law rule that constrains judicial discretion by establishing a preference for awarding custody to the parent who had provided most of the daily care of the child.87
But not all devices that constrain or decrease litigation are worth adopting. The procedural advantages of constraints on discretion sometimes come at a substantive cost. Children have an interest in achieving certain substantive custody outcomes as well as avoiding dif ficult processes. Thus, the advantages of lessening litigation need to be weighed against the disadvantage of losing judicial power to choose better placements for children. A random process like the suggested coin flip is not tailored toward eliminating litigation in any particular class of cases likely to lead to undesirable substantive outcomes. Using random measures, children will certainly end up in less desirable placements a significant amount of the time. 88 The common law rule eliminating consideration of wealth is a compelling means of reducing litigation because it is tailored to a class of cases where eliminating the rule is also likely to correlate with bet ter substantive outcomes. As we have seen, a rule eliminating consid erations of wealth can enhance the quality of substantive decisions about custody. At its extremes, this rule will discourage parents who have little claim to custody other than financial advantage (which is of limited value compared to other parental features)89 from litigating their custody disputes. The rule proposed here is much more like the presumption that a child should be placed with her primary care taker,90 which limits discretion in a way that also generally correlates with desirable substantive outcomes.
Elimination of wealth also lessens another troublesome practice, money-for-custody trades. For this reason, children of parents who eventually settle out of court will be better off with a custody rule that eliminates consideration of this factor. Wide discretion in custody out comes leads to uncertain results; parents who are not willing to risk losing custody of their children (often the most committed parents) 86. Elster, supra note 22, at 40-43. Contra Herring, supra note 43, at 232-37 (id<!ntifying advantages and disadvantages of the coin-flip solution and concluding that the latter out weigh the former). may not be willing to enter litigation. In their settlements, they may sacrifice property division and child support arrangements in order to ensure custody.91 This leaves children without the benefit of those fi nancial resources, and, on the whole, worse off. 92 Removing the ability of parents to use wealth as a weapon in pri vate bargains addresses this problem directly. Aiming the common law rule at parents who have little to offer other than financial gain is a very finely tuned means of addressing the financial bargaining prob lem. It would most commonly remove a bargaining tool from the wealthier parent in situations where the financial disparity between the parties is the greatest. It is precisely in these situations where a parent whose claim to custody would otherwise be weak, that a parent would be able to credibly litigate on the basis of financial advantage. The children of these parents have the most to lose when one parent sacrifices a financial settlement for custody.
Finally, eliminating wealth as a factor in custody disputes discour ages a noncustodial parent from stopping voluntary support payments to the custodial parent and children before the litigation is settled, as a means of ensuring that the financial disparities between the parties will appear more pronounced.93 This sort of behavior clearly works against the interests of children. Thus, removing consideration of wealth discourages some of the least beneficial litigation and bad bar gaining behavior outside of litigation to the benefit of the children in volved in these cases.
III. DEFENDING THE EXCEPTION
Despite the arguments above, that considering wealth is actually against children's interests, setting a floor -consideration of a par ent's ability to provide for the child's basic needs -can be justified. The arguments against considering wealth when the minimum can be met typically fall apart when children are in danger of being deprived [Vol. 99:216 of the essentials of existence. Here, forcing courts to ignore basic needs would run up against the goal of child neglect statutes. Soon af ter the child was placed with the parent who could not provide for ba sic needs, child protective services involvement would become immi nent, and the child would most likely be eventually removed to the home of the parent with greater resources, anyway.94 The concerns about inaccuracy in decisionmaking if these factors are considered is greatly decreased -while overvaluation of the importance of mar ginal degrees of wealth between parents may be inevitable, it is not likely that the importance of children being well fed, or receiving basic medical care, could be given too much weight. 95 The importance of a minimum also suggests an option for courts working within states where consideration of parental wealth is man dated by statute, such as in Michigan and Florida;96 these courts could read the statute to only require consideration of these basic human needs. The focus of the language of these statutory provisions is on the basics of human survival -food, clothing, medical care -and not on the more marginal benefits of having one's own room, or having more expensive toys. Michigan's statutory language requires consideration of "the capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recog nized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs." 97 Florida's statutory language is al most identical. Even the catch all at the end is phrased as "other mate rial needs," not other material benefits or advantages. 98 It is thus quite possible to consider these statutory provisions as only setting forth a requirement of consideration of minimum financial provision. Thus, even those states who seem to require consideration of parental wealth in making child custody decisions can adopt the suggested rule. 95. The notion is that wealth is "conditionally relevant" -it is not relevant to children's best interests more generally, but it is relevant to the ability of a parent to meet bask needs. 
